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Professor Bell's article, "The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury,"1 is the most comprehensive and detailed
statement supporting recovery for negligently inflicted psychic harm
I have seen.2 While most arguments favoring expanded liability for
emotional'harm have urged some cut-off short of foreseeability, 3 Professor Bell would remove all doctrinal barriers to recovery except
foreseeability. He marshals an impressive array of arguments in support of a full recovery rule. In an earlier issue of this journal,4 I argued that recovery for emotional harm not resulting from physical
impact should be limited to those in the zone of danger of physical
impact. My purpose here is to respond to Professor Bell's article calling for broader liability.
Before addressing those arguments with which I disagree, it is
worth mentioning that there are many points made by Professor Bell
*Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law; B.B.A., 1950, Michigan, LL.B.,
1956, Boston University, LL.M., 1964, Yale University.
1. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REv.
333 (1984). The reference in the title to John Donne's poem seems a bit overdone. I do not
believe that one's attitude toward expanded recovery for emotional harm is a test of one's "involvement in mankinde."
2. On another occasion, I have referred to the kind of harm involved as "emotional
harm." See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - A
Comment on the Nature of ArbitraryRules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477 (1982). Professor Bell uses
the word "psychic." For the purpose of this response, the two words can be taken as
interchangeable.
3. See Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime", 1 U. HAwAn L. REv. 1 (1981) (recovery should be
limited to economic loss); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982) (recovery should be limited to cases of
serious emotional distress); Note, The Death of the Ensuing Physical Injury Rule: Validating
Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1981) (generally
approves the Dillon rule as the appropriate limitation).
4. See Pearson, supra note 2.
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with which I do agree. Chief among these is his dislike of Dillon v.
Legg.' The Dillon court characterized the zone of danger rule as arbitrary because it precludes compensation for some foreseeable harm.
The main point of my earlier article was that Dillon represents no
improvement in the law if arbitrariness is the test. The Supreme
Court of California did not adopt a foreseeability rule; rather, it limited recovery to persons witnessing accidents involving close relatives Having demonstrated the arbitrary nature of Dillon,7 I might
have refrained from taking a stand on the zone of danger rule. Yet
that would have left too long a thread dangling. Thus, while Professor Bell and I agree that the rule of Dillon is not a good one,8 we
disagree on where to go from there.
Professor Bell asserts that the full recovery rule is supported by
arguments relating to entitlement theory,9 accident cost reduction,"
compensation," and justice considerations. 2 Part I of this response
will address the main thrust of these four arguments. Part II will
consider separately the problem of trivial harm.
I.

ENTITLEMENT THEORY

The most puzzling argument Professor Bell makes in support of
the full recovery rule is that based on entitlement theory - that
psychic well-being is an entitlement justifying full recovery. Professor
Bell approaches his analysis from two perspectives: that of the
"originalist"' and that of the "instrumentalist."' 4 The instrumentalist discussion relies primarily upon an article by Professors Calabresi
and Melamed. 15 Professor Bell's instrumentalist analysis of psychic
5. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d at 912, 69 Cal. Rtpr. 72 (1968).
6. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 80. Professor Bell reads Dillon as standing
for the full recovery rule, and views later California cases as failing to fulfill Dillon's promise.
See Bell, supra note 1, at 338-39. Dillon is at best ambiguous on this point, however. See
Pearson, supra note 2, at 491-99.
7. See Pearson, supra note 2.
8. Professor Bell did not address Dillon from the same perspective as I did. He seems to
have concluded that the Dillon rule is a bad one only when compared to the full recovery rule.
My point was that it is a bad rule because it is arbitrary. Perhaps given a choice between the
zone of danger rule and the Dillon rule, Professor Bell would choose the latter. Were I given a
choice between the Dillon rule and the full recovery rule, I would reject Dillon. I think that
Dillon and the cases it has spawned can aptly be described as a mish-mash, unexplainable by
any standard of logic or policy. In my view, cases like Dillon do great harm to the law, notwithstanding occasional compensation to a plaintiff.
9. See Bell, supra note 1, at 341-47.
10. Id. at 347-91.
11. Id. at 391-99.
12. Id. at 399-412.
13. Id. at 341-43.
14. Id. at 341, 343-44.
15. Calabresi & Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View
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harm, however, does not fit within the entitlement concept as those
authors developed it. They define entitlements as interests protected
by property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. An interest
protected by a property rule is an entitlement if to acquire it from
the owner one must buy it through a voluntary transaction.' If the
interest is protected by a liability rule, a person may interfere with it
without the owner's free consent, but must pay the value assessed by
the state. 17 Finally, an interest is protected by an inalienability rule if
the owner cannot freely sell it to a willing buyer.' s As Professor Bell
discusses psychic well-being, it is protected by none of these rules.
Clearly, as Professor Bell recognizes, e one can interfere with another's psychic well-being, even intentionally, without purchasing the
well-being in a voluntary transaction or paying a state determined
value of the harm caused by the interference. The interferer must
pay for injuries he caused only if he is "culpable," as Professor Bell
states.20 According to Calabresi and Melamed, however, culpability is
irrelevant to whether an interest is protected as an entitlement.
Thus, the "instrumentalists" would not characterize freedom from
invasions of psychic well-being as an entitlement.
Professor Bell's discussion of the originalist perspective is no
more apt. For support for this perspective, he turns to John Rawls'
classic treatise on the theoretical foundations of a just society.2 ' Professor Bell argues that those in the Rawlsian original position would
not "agree to give others the right to cause them significant psychic
injury. Psychic well-being.., is too important to the individual to
surrender."22 Rawls' analysis does not support this claim for a number of reasons. First, Rawls does not deal with rules of law at this low
a level of abstraction. 23 He proposes only basic political rights and
of the Cathedral,85 HARv.L. REV. 1089 (1972).
16. Id. at 1092.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1092-93.
19. See Bell, supra note 1, at 336-37 nn.10-20.
20. Id. at 341 n.40.
21. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
22. Bell, supra note 1, at 342.
23. As Professor Fried observed in his review of the book:
Rawls proposes as basic rights only liberty of conscience, political rights necessary to
exercise one's status as citizen, the right to be free from arbitrary authority inconsistent
with the rule of law and just procedures, equality of opportunity, and the right to
whatever share of income is implied by the distributive norms of the second principle of
justice (sections 32, 36, 38 and ch. V). Rights to bodily security, to the security of family
relationships or to freedom of motion must depend either on the process of development
of essentially just institutions (section 31) - i.e., those that guarantee liberty of conscience and equal participation - or on the concept of just distribution under the second principle.
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income distribution norms as the necessary fibre of a just society.
Certain personal rights, such as physical and emotional security, depend upon the developmental process of just institutions and distributions of income. Thus, entitlement to psychic well-being is not an
issue which society's originators would contemplate as a separate element in social formation. Rather, appropriate mechanisms for protecting psychic well-being are products of an uncertain development
subsequent to that formation.
Second, Professor Bell overstates what those in the original position would agree to with respect to psychic well-being even if they
were inclined to consider the matter. Even in his view they would
presumably agree to permit nonculpable interferences. Otherwise, the
restraints on interests in movement and speech would be intolerable.
Moreover, it is not clear the originalists would even prohibit culpable
interference with psychic well-being. Perhaps they would prohibit intentional wrongful interference, but it is not self-evident that they
would also prohibit negligent interference. Arguments made for limiting tort recovery for intangible harm are too legion24 to suggest that
society's originators would clearly insist on protecting psychic wellbeing through a tort system.
I agree with Professor Bell that psychic well-being is an important
value. But that is where analysis should begin rather than end. Entitlement theory, whether from an originalist or instrumentalist perspective, does not aid in determining whether and under what circumstances tort law is an appropriate vehicle for vindicating one's
interest in psychic well-being.
II.

ACCIDENT COST REDUCTION

As with entitlement theory, Professor Bell relies on the work of
Professor Calabresi in support of his position that a concern with accident cost reduction requires the full recovery rule. Professor Bell
adopts Professor Calabresi's categorization of accident costs as primary, secondary and tertiary.2 5 As to each category, Professor Bell
attempts to demonstrate how the rule would decrease, or at least not
increase, accident costs.
Primary accident costs result directly from the injury and are
those for which damages in tort actions are normally available. These
costs include medical and related expenses, impairment of earning
capacity, and some forms of intangible harm, such as the pain and
Fried, Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1697 (1972).
24. See infra notes 63 and 64.
25. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS oF ACCIDENTS 26-28 (1970).
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suffering associated with physical injury. Such costs can be reduced
by diminishing either the frequency or the severity of accidents. Professor Bell reserves most of his discussion of the full recovery rule's
potential for reducing the severity of injuries for his section on compensation. My comments on that point will be made in Section 111.26
In theory, imposing tort liability on an actor can reduce the frequency of accidents in two ways. An actor may be motivated by the
threat of liability to alter his behavior by employing safety measures
that will reduce the likelihood an accident will occur; or an actor may
reduce his participation in, or avoid altogether, an activity because of
the projected accident costs involved. It is not always clear in which
sense Professor Bell argues that the full recovery rule will reduce primary accident costs, 28 so I will say a word about both.
It is unlikely in the extreme that the law relating to damages for
emotional harm will have any impact on how people behave. The law
cannot affect how a person acts in any given situation unless he
knows the law and is motivated to take it into account in deciding
how to behave. At least with respect to the kind of case Professor
Bell and I are primarily concerned with, liability to bystanders for
emotional harm resulting from injury to another, neither condition is
likely to be met. Very few outside the legal profession, and not many
more inside it, know the law respecting bystander liability. Even for
those few who do know the law, it is hard to imagine that any of
them would decide whether to drive in an otherwise negligent manner based on an on-the-spot, detailed assessment of the harm that
might be suffered by potential bystanders in the event of an accident.
It is more likely that the law will have a direct and specific effect,
under some circumstances, with respect to emotional harm suffered
in non-bystander cases. These circumstances involve what one commentator has referred to as the model of rational decisionmaking.
This model of behavior most often involves institutional settings in
which the actors have access to information necessary to gauge risks,
26. See infra notes 44-52.
27. Professor Calabresi includes both of these forms of accident costs reduction under the
term "general deterrence." Calabresi, supra note 25. Both forms of deterrence could, of course,
affect total accident costs by reducing the severity as well as the frequency of accidents. An
actor might wear seat belts if he thought the recovery he would otherwise be entitled to would
be reduced if he failed to do so. Or manufacturers of automobiles might be moved to design
automobiles that are more "crashworthy" as a cheaper alternative to paying damages caused by
a less crashworthy design. This does not appear to be relevant to Professor Bell's central thesis,
so I won't pursue it further.
28. Professor Bell does appear to recognize the two ways in which liability can affect accident costs when he asserts that when the costs of an activity exceed the benefits, the actor "will
choose either not to engage in that behavior or to modify it. . . ." Bell, supra note 1, at 348. In
his discussion, however, he does not discuss the two effects separately.
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identify alternative solutions, and consciously select the appropriate
course of action. 9 Thus, in cases like Johnson v. New York, 30 where
the defendant hospital erroneously and negligently informed the
plaintiff that her mother had died, imposing liability for the emotional harm suffered by the plaintiff may affect the defendant's behavior leading, in that case, to more accurate recordkeeping. In most
instances, however, even in those involving rational decisionmaking,
imposing liability for emotional harm is unlikely to have any effect
on behavior. If the defendant's conduct exposes him to liability apart
from the emotional harm, he is likely to modify his behavior based on
that increment of liability. The potential liability for the emotional
harm will not provide a significant added incentive. Hospitals' quality control will be affected almost entirely by liability to its patients,3 and not at all because of the rare potential for liability to
other persons who may suffer measurable emotional harm.
There is more merit to the suggestion that the full recovery rule
will have an impact on the extent to which persons engage in various
activities. Yet even here, deterrence will not work unless there is an
up front, "pay at the door" charge for engaging in the activity. This
is because most people lack the information needed to make their
own independent and intelligent risk assessments.3 2 With respect to
some activities, this pay ahead of time feature is present. Many states
require, through compulsory insurance or financial responsibility
plans, liability insurance as a condition of registering automobiles. It
also exists with respect to consumption of products, as the cost of
personal injuries is reflected in the prices paid for the products.3 3
29. The key ingredients of rational action are foreknowledge of risks, identification of
options, deliberate assessment of costs and benefits, and calculated choice over a period
of time. Rational decisionmaking is often marked by indicia of formal choice - group
deliberations, the gathering of information, assessments of recurring experience, and documentary exchange. The rational decisionmaking model typically involves a firm, acting
over time, aware of regularly recurring risks and faced with investment decisions about
reducing those risks.
Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 So. CAL. L. REV.
1, 6 (1980).
30. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
31. An example is Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1981), in which the defendant hospital was held liable for the emotional harm suffered by the husband of a patient who had been erroneously diagnosed as having syphilis. Potential liability to third persons is unlikely to add much incentive to change practices.
32. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 25, at 55-58.
33. The extent to which there is recovery for emotional harm without impact in products
liability cases is still uncertain. Some early cases barred recovery. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Brockelman Bros., Inc., 334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956). More recently, bystanders have been
permitted to recover in design cases, in which the basis of liability is essentially negligence. See
Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982); Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.
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Many states do not, however, require automobile insurance, and in
those that do, the typically required limits are not high.3 4 Furthermore, Professor Bell himself recognizes the limited effect of insurance
as an entry fee in his response to the argument that the full recovery
rule will result in crushing liability. He observed that in California
one insurance company has not raised premiums at all because. of
emotional harm liability. 5 This does not mean that the deterrence
argument necessarily lacks merit with respect to liability for emotional harm. Tort damages can be broken down into small categories,
some of which would not be particularly significant, but which taken
collectively would have an impact. If there are valid arguments in
opposition to the full recovery rule, however, little deterrence of primary accident costs will be lost if the arguments against the full recovery rule are accepted.
Secondary accident costs are the dislocation losses caused by the
accident, and are not generally recoverable in tort. Professor Bell
does not so much argue the full recovery rule will reduce these costs
as he does that it will not increase them. First he addresses the fear
that unlimited liability will deter persons from engaging in otherwise
socially useful activity, and concludes this is not a valid concern.
With that I agree; in my earlier article I disposed of that argument,
perhaps too cavalierly, in a footnote. 6
The second concern he addresses is the argument that the full
recovery rule will increase the psychic harm in society. This might
' 7
occur because the rule will result in "softened" "mental hides,"
thereby increasing the susceptibility to psychic harm, or because the
plaintiff's harm will be exacerbated by the trauma of a law suit. Professor Bell asserts that the full recovery rule will not increase these
App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977). The court in Walker specifically stated that recovery
would also be permitted in cases of breach of warranty and strict tort liability. A complaint by
a bystander alleging negligence with respect to a manufacturing defect was held to have stated
a cause of action in Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). See also
Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress - Bystander Recovery, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 797
(1983) (arguing that bystander recovery should be permitted in cases involving liability without
fault); Comment, Product Manufacturers; Strict Liability for Emotional Injury in Iowa:
Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 68 IowA L. REv. 853 (1983) (same).
S.34. See, e.g., COLo. REv. STAT. 10-4-705 (1982) ($25,000 for injury to one person, $50,000
for a single accident); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 1A & 34A (West 1977) ($10,000/
$20,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 & 309 (1983) ($25,000/$50,000); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:6B-1
(1982) ($15,000/$30,000); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §§ 312 & 343 (Consol. 1983) ($10,000!

$20,000).
35. Bell, supra note 1, at 366-67.
36. Pearson, supra note 2, at 507 n.170.
37. The reference here is to Magruder's famous assertion that "a certain toughening of
the mental hide is a better protection than the law ever could be." Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbancein the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

costs, and may perhaps reduce them. Essentially his argument is a
defensive one that secondary cost considerations do not furnish a reason for opposing the full recovery rule. Although I have no strong
feeling that he is wrong, there is one point worthy of response.
Professor Bell asserts that to the extent that the full recovery rule
does soften psychic hides, it is good rather than bad. Such a process
would lead to "deeper relationships among people," and "as people
become more sensitive to feelings and interpersonal relations, they
will be less likely to take actions which damage others' lives and less
likely to permit their governments to do so."" s That, it strikes me,
would not be an unalloyed benefit. There is considerable evidence
that as a society we are becoming overly sensitive. Whether increased
sensitivity is leading to "deeper relations among people" is hard to
gauge, but we certainly are becoming more easily offended and quick
to demand official vindication of perceived slights to our psyches. Recently a Time Magazine essay reviewed the extent to which "sensitive" - "thin-skinned" might be a better word - people have
sought to eliminate offensive qualities from advertisements, television programs and motion pictures.3 9 The essay begins by reporting
objections made by the Michigan Commission on Services to the Aging to a television commercial for a fast food chain, which featured
three elderly women complaining about the size of a hamburger.
Other groups which have mounted attacks on the media because various presentations have offended them are Puerto Ricans, blacks,
orientals, homosexuals, American Indians, Italians, Cubans, and even
American businessmen. The essay captures the heart of the problem
in the following excerpt:
Much of the yelping at the media seems deeply trivial. A New
York coven of witches complained when ABC televised Rosemary's Baby. A marine biologist was bothered by the negative
image of sharks in Jaws, and UFO enthusiasts groused when a
woman was raped by a space alien on Fernwood 2 Night.
Their point was that aliens do not go around raping people,
and indeed there is little evidence that they do. The National
Association to Aid Fat Americans mounted a stout protest
against the Dom DeLuise movie Fatso. The group does not
mind the word fat, but fatso is a red flag. NAAFA also took a
swipe at the Diet Pepsi campaign for showing "emaciated, almost anorextic women." No rebuttal has been recorded, possibly because there is as yet no thin people's lobby to return the
38.
39.

Bell, supra note 1, at 376.
Time, Apr. 23, 1984, at 85-86.
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fire.40

Not all such complaints are insubstantial. With special interest
groups to represent almost every segment of society, however, there is
a real risk courts will be called upon to be arbiters of good taste in
the name of protecting people from psychic harm. Whether or not we
have become a more litigious society of late,4 1 our judicial resources
are scarce enough so that we should be aware of the broader effects of
the full recovery rule. A "toughening of the mental hide".4 2 may indeed be the best defense against much of the assault on psychic wellbeing. In any event, it is uncertain, as Professor Bell admits, that
recovery for emotional harm will affect sensitivity one way or the
other. If the law does not discourage law suits in an increasingly sensitive society, however, we can expect more claims of the sort discussed in the Time essay. This is a decided cost, not a benefit, of the
full recovery rule.43
Professor Bell's discussion of tertiary costs, the overhead costs of
administering claims, relates primarily to the problem of trivial
claims - whether the costs of processing claims under the full recovery rule would exceed the benefits derivable from the rule. Obviously, Professor Bell thinks that the rule yields net benefits. This issue is, I believe, worthy of special attention and I turn to it in Part V
of this paper.
II.

COMPENSATION

The difficulty with the compensation section of Professor Bell's
article stems from the oft asserted statement, which he appears to
accept, that one goal of tort law is compensation.4 4 Damages are certainly the remedy most often sought in tort cases, but compensation
is not an end in itself. So long as the torts system does not provide
universal compensation for accidental injuries, compensation as a
goal does not help to determine who among those who suffer otherwise compensable injuries should actually be compensated. That
many persons are compensated through the torts system does not
make compensation a goal. If that were the case, one could as well
argue that the compensation of lawyers is also a goal of the torts
40. Id.

41. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.LA L.
REv. 4 (1983).

42. See Magruder, supra note 37.
43. My argument here is obviously tied into the problem of trivial claims which I discuss
later. See infra text accompanying notes 67-91.
44. Bell, supra note 1, at 391.
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system.46

A second aspect to Professor Bell's argument is that those suffering psychic harm have no less need for compensation than those suffering physical harm. He asserts that damages for psychic harm are
restorative in the same sense as are damages for physical harm."'
While Part V, which deals with the significance of harm in psychic
injury cases, responds to much of this argument, several comments
are appropriate here.
Professor Bell argues that the potential for psychic injury compensation will induce victims to seek early psychological treatment,
and thus reduce the effects of such injury. He cites mass disaster
cases as examples of how early psychological treatment has helped
victims avoid greater subsequent psychological harm. 7 Whether or
not mass disaster cases involve different problems with respect to the
benefits of early intervention from typical tort cases is something I
am not capable of judging.4 8 It is hardly clear, however, that potential
tort liability will lead to increased early psychological intervention.
As Professor Bell tells us, expenses for treating traumatically induced
psychic harm are covered by most group health plans.4 9 In those
cases, potential tort recovery will provide no added inducement to
seek treatment. For those without insurance, it is problematic
whether the uncertain potential for future recovery will lead a person
to incur a present expense for psychic counseling particularly since
treatment for psychic harm often seems to be viewed as optional. °
45.

This is a charge sometimes made about the legal system generally. See, e.g., P. STERN,

LAWYERS ON TRIAL

59 (1980).

46. Professor Bell's discussion here is a bit unclear; he confuses the issue of whether the
plaintiff needs compensation with whether he deserves it, which are two very different points.
For example, compare the following statements, which appear on the same page: "In other
words, the issue for this section is: how strongly does the need to compensate the psychologically injured pull towards the full recovery rule?" Bell, supra note 1, at 391. "There is certainly
nothing in the nature of the injury to suggest that the psychologically injured plaintiff has any
less reason to expect the compassion of the legal system than other injured persons." Id.
47. Id. at 396.
48. Professor Bell's argument here is based on an article in the N.Y. Times, July 6, 1982,
at C-1, col. 2, dealing with the collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City. Much of the
psychological reaction of the survivors, and of the interest of psychologists in that reaction,
seems to stem from the fact that it was a mass disaster.
49. Bell, supra note 1, at 370 n.150.
50. I accept Professor Bell's assertion that people with psychic harm are less likely to seek
professional help than those with pbysical injury, even if insurance for treatment of the former
is available. Id. at 396 n.245. This must mean, I suppose, that persons with psychic injury view
professional treatment as optional in a way that people with physical injury do not. Although
Kansas City mental health centers established elaborate and well-publicized mental health
counselling facilities for the survivors of the hotel disaster, the "overwhelming majority" of
those surveyed later reported that the most important support came from family and friends.
See N.Y. Times, July 6, 1982, at C-1, col. 2.
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Professor Bell concludes with two points not relating directly to
compensation. A judgment for the plaintiff, he asserts, is a "societal
expression of sympathy."5 1 That is an odd point to make, since a tort
judgment is not given simply because the plaintiff has been hurt. In
addition, the defendant must also be culpable, which is irrelevant to
whether the injured plaintiff is entitled to societal sympathy.
Professor Bell also asserts that damages will provide a fund of
money to make the plaintiff's life better. This apparently contradicts
a point made in my earlier article that damages will not offset
psychic harm, such as that suffered by Mrs. Dillon, in the same way
it offsets physical pain.52 Damages will increase the plaintiff's wealth
and perhaps enable him, as Professor Bell states, to buy a new house,
make charitable contributions, or travel. In that sense the plaintiff's
overall well-being may increase, as it would for most persons who acquire more money for those purposes. Damages would not make Mrs.
Dillon's psychic pain any easier to bear, however, and in that sense
would not be compensatory.
IV.

JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS

Professor Bell argues that the full recovery rule advances the
cause of justice in two ways: it would eliminate inconsistency between
the law's treatment of psychic harm and other factually indistinguishable forms of intangible harm, and it would advance the "principle of proportionality, that one should pay according to his wrong
53
and recover according to his loss."
The basis of Professor Bell's consistency argument is that all intangible harm is similar because it operates on and through the mind.
It is therefore inconsistent, for example, to allow recovery for pain
and suffering and deny recovery for purely psychic injury. Such a
broad definition of intangible harm, however, is not particularly helpful. In the conventional way we think about such things, as Professor
Bell recognizes, 54 there are differences between various forms of intangible harm, such as grief, fright, physical pain, and loss of enjoyment. Two aspirin four times a day may help to relieve back pain,
but I doubt it would have helped Mrs. Dillon. Enough differences
exist between the various forms of intangible harm so that a well developed sense of fairness would not necessarily demand the law treat
them all alike. Simply because there are differences does not mean
that they should necessarily be treated differently. The outcome of
51.
52.

Bell, supra note 1, at 398.
Pearson, supra note 2, at 402-04.

53. Bell, supra note 1, at 399.
54. Id. at 399-408.
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the consistency argument should depend on other considerations. I
will briefly discuss some of these.
Consistency does not require that the law ignore the circumstances under which the harm was inflicted. Providing a remedy for
intentionally inflicted emotional harm, for example, does not necessarily mean a remedy should be provided for negligently inflicted harm.
Intentional conduct may generate a greater concern in the law than
conduct that is only negligent. 5 The importance of circumstances
producing a harm is demonstrated by the law relating to economic
loss. Just as all intangible harm can be put into a single category, so
can all tangible harm. No matter what form the latter takes, such as
impaired capacity to earn, medical expenses, or loss of profits, out-ofpocket economic loss is involved. Yet, circumstances do affect
recoverability. Traditionally, purely consequential commercial loss
unassociated with personal injury or property damage to the plaintiff
is not recoverable.5 6 While some recent cases have permitted recovery
in narrow circumstances, 57 none have suggested foreseeability as the
only test of recovery. Most specifically recognize the need for some
other limit on liability. Basic principles of justice do not demand that
all general classes of foreseeable harm should be treated the same
apart from the circumstances under which harm occurs.
To the extent that consistency in treating all intangible harms the
same is desired, there is more than one way to achieve it. Professor
Bell points to a number of cases in which plaintiffs have recovered
damages for emotional harm as a result of property destruction." I
would argue the way to achieve consistency here is to eliminate liability in such cases. The court in Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co.59 aptly
summarized the situation as follows:
It is entirely common and predictable . . . that a person will
be disturbed and upset when someone negligently breaks the
headlight of his or her cherished automobile or causes a soft55. See Pearson, supra note 2, at 486.
56. See Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 34 (11th Cir. 1982); Stevenson v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d (Ohio App. 1946).
57. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Pruitt v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 23 Cal. 3d 779, 598 P.2d 60,
157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). The concern in these cases is with crushing liability, and liability out
of proportion to the defendant's culpability.
58. Bell, supra note 1, at nn.261, 267, 298-300. One of the cases Professor Bell cites,
Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980), involves outrageous
conduct, and thus is irrelevant to the present discussion. The authority of another, Senn v.
Bunick, 40 Or. App. 33, 594 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1979), has been undercut by a more recent case
from the intermediate Oregon Court of Appeals, Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co., 60 Or. App. 70,
652 P.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1982).
59. 60 Or. App. 70, 652 P.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1982).
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ball to crash through a picture window. We do not yet live,
however, in an "eggshell society" in which every harm to
property interests gives rise to a right of action for mental
distress.6 0
Professor Bell argues that consistency should be achieved by expanding liability rather than contracting it, but that is not a consistency argument.
My final point about the consistency argument is in a sense political. Whatever similarity there is between psychic harm and physical
pain and suffering, I would not urge that as a basis for expanding
liability. Many questions have been raised about the appropriateness
and magnitude6 1 of compensation for physical pain and suffering.6 2
Significant inroads into pain and suffering recovery have been made
by workers' compensation and no-fault automobile insurance systems. I am not here urging that consistency in the law be achieved by
abolishing all recovery for physical pain and suffering, even if that
could be accomplished constitutionally.6 3 Rather, my point is that
emerging attitudes toward compensation for intangible harm do not
60. Id. at 82, 652 P.2d at 857.
61. The concern about the level of recovery for intangible harm is perhaps most clearly
demonstrated by the medical malpractice statutes that establish ceilings on recovery. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4203 to -4205 (1977) (physicians and hospital liability limited to $150,000 for
one patient and to $300,000 for a single occurrence); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums 1980)
(limits health care provider liability to $100,000 per claim and patient recovery to a total of
$500,000). Legislation has been filed in New York which would limit pain and suffering recovery in medical malpractice cases to $100,000). See Note, Medical MalpracticeDamage Awards:
The Need for a Dual Approach, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 973, 988 n.88 (1983).
62. See, e.g., the well known dissenting opinion of Justice Traynor in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 364 P.2d 337, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1961).
There has been forceful criticism of the rationale for awarding damages for pain and
suffering in negligence cases. Such damages originated under primitive law as a means of
punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who have been wronged. They
become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc
punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or
of transportation. Ultimately such losses are borne by a public free of fault as part of the
price for the benefits of mechanization.
Id. at 511, 364 P.2d at 345, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (citations omitted). One need not agree with all
he said there to recognize that thinking of this sort has had an effect on modern law. Many nofault automobile insurance statutes, for instance, put limits on recovery for pain and suffering
in negligence cases.
63. Statutes limiting recovery in medical malpractice cases were held unconstitutional in
Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (overall $500,000
limitation); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) ($250,000 limitation on pain
and suffering recovery). The Idaho statute referred to supra note 61 was held constitutional in
Jones v. Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976). Other cases upholding caps on
damages in medical malpractice cases are Fern v. Permante Med. Group, Cal....
P.2d (1985); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985).
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require compensation for all such harm simply because it is provided
for some.
Professor Bell's proportionality argument appears to be a restatement of his earlier discussion involving the crushing liability argument.6 4 As I have already indicated, I do not believe that the fear of
such liability is a substantial argument against the full recovery
65
rule.
V. TRIVIAL CLAIMS
My earlier article briefly discussed a number of reasons for opposing extension of negligence liability for emotional harm to the full
limit of foreseeability 6 This part will elaborate on one of the points
I made there: the typical claim for emotional harm would be trivial
and, therefore, the law should not recognize a general tort for negligent infliction of emotional harm.17 Trivial claims ought not to be
recognized, I asserted, because the transaction costs of processing
claims would outweigh the minimal benefits of shifting generally
small losses among people most of whom at one time or another are
both victims and inflicters of negligently inflicted emotional harm.68
Professor Bell agrees that the argument of compensating trivial harm
is not a strong one, or at least not as strong as that for compensating
significant emotional harm. 69 We do disagree as to what effect the
presence of trivial claims should have on the law.
One source of disagreement may be our different definitions of a
trivial claim. Professor Bell suggests that approximately $500 would
mark the appropriate dividing line between the trivial and the significant.70 I would place the dividing line considerably higher, although I
am not sure by how much. Perhaps some guidelines can be derived
from no-fault automobile insurance. Many no-fault statutes preclude
tort liability for physical pain and suffering for less serious injuries.
Some tort exemptions are geared directly to the character of the
physical injury, and preclude recovery unless the injury is a serious
one.71 Others bar pain and suffering recovery where the medical expenses are below a specified threshold; it is these thresholds which
64. Bell, supra note 1, at 408-12.
65. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
66. Pearson, supra note 2, at 507-13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 508.
69. Bell, supra note 1, at 345.
70. Id. at 385.
71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1983) (permits recovery for pain and suffering only
if there is a "significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function," permanent injury
other than a scar or disfigurement, "significant scarring or disfigurement," or death).
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support my argument that the line between trivial and significant
emotional harm should be more than $500. Currently, the medical
expense thresholds range from $200 in New Jersey 2 to $4,000 in
Minnesota.7 3 The average of all the state medical expense thresholds
is about $775. Applying a conservative rule of thumb that moderately
clear cases of liability would be settled for about five times the special damages, the average medical expense threshold would preclude
recovery for pain and suffering in cases worth less than $2,500.7' Although there is no empirical proof, I am confident the vast majority
of claims for negligently inflicted emotional harm would involve damages considerably less than that amount. I am not arguing that a
$2,500 claim for emotional harm, or pain and suffering, should be
characterized as trivial. Yet the medical expense threshold does represent judgment that intangible harm in that amount is something
an injured person should be expected to suffer without compensation.
Even if Professor Bell and I could agree on the definition and frequency of trivial harm, we would still disagree over how the law
should respond to those claims. I do not argue that all cases of emotional harm are trivial any more than Professor Bell would argue that
none are trivial. Both of us agree that the trivial cannot be separated
from the significant by a rule of law phrased directly in those terms. I
adhere to the assertion made in my earlier article:
Severity is not an either/or proposition; it is rather a matter of
degree. Thus, any attempt to formulate a general rule would
almost inevitably result in a threshold requirement of severity
so high that only a handful would meet it, or so low that it
would be an ineffective screen. A middle-ground rule would be
doomed, for it would call upon courts to distinguish between
large numbers7 5of cases factually too similar to warrant different treatment.
Professor Bell makes the point somewhat differently, but he seems
to accept it.76 Rather than deny recovery, he relies primarily on selfscreening to keep the problem of trivial claims to manageable proportions. He states:
For centuries, the courts have permitted a physically injured
plaintiff to sue regardless of the seriousness of his injury.
39:6A-8(a) (West 1983).
§ 65D.51(3)(a) (West 1983).
Adding out of pocket wage loss to the specials in calculating the worth of a case would
a figure even higher than this.
Pearson, supra note 2, at 511.
Bell, supra note 1, at 386.
STAT. ANN. §
MINN. STAT. ANN.

72. N.J.
73.

74.
result in
75.
76.
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Many intentional tort actions do not require the plaintiff to
have been injured at all. Yet there has been no flood of trivial
claims for such torts, despite the multitude of slight physically injurious contacts which occur daily. The reasons there
are so few trivial physical injury claims would also keep trivial
psychic injury cases to a minimum under the full recovery
rule. Suing someone is economically, psychologically and temporally, expensive. Most tort cases proceed on a contingency
fee basis, with the fee ranging between one-fifth and twofifths of the damage recovery. To take such a case to trial if
the plaintiff will recover only $400-500 in damages is simply
not worth the lawyer's time."
I am less confident than Professor Bell about the effectiveness of
a self-screening process. One reason relates to our disagreement as to
the definition of trivial. Self-screening will naturally keep out a
higher percentage of trivial claims if one defines trivial at the $400 to
$500 level. As I have indicated, I would put the cut-off point considerably higher, 78 at a level that would make claims more attractive to
pursue. Even at the lower level, however, the small claim may be
worth pursuing for its settlement value, even if it would not be worth
the cost of trial. In fact, in the early days of the no-fault debate,
some argued that smaller claims receive more compensation relative
to economic loss than do larger claims.7 Even though many of the
smaller claims are settled without litigation, they do involve costs to
society that are not born by the claimant.
A second reason for doubting the efficacy of self-screening relates
to Professor Bell's reference to intentional torts. Some persons may
decline to pursue intentional torts not just because they are trivial,
but because there is no chance of recovery. Liability insurance does
not ordinarily provide coverage for intentional torts, thus making recovery not worth pursuing regardless of the prospective damage. Furthermore, the point is not, as Professor Bell suggests, whether there
would be a "flood of trivial claims" 0 presented to the legal process
for decision. Rather, the issue is whether it is worth the dispute
resolving resources that would be consumed in handling whatever
number of claims are made. I have already indicated that I do not
think so.
Professor Bell has an intriguing fall back position. He proposes
77.
78.
79.
tives, 44
80.

Id. at 388.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See Pearson, Implementing the No-Fault Concept: An Analysis of Some AlternaMiss. L.J. 74, 90-91 (1973), for a discussion of the statistics.
Bell, supra note 1, at 388.
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solving the problem of trivial claims by reducing an award for psychic
harm by a specified dollar amount, he suggests $500.81 Although, for
reasons already discussed, 82 $500 strikes me as too low, I agree the
deductible approach would eliminate trivial claims. But whatever its
merits, it is unlikely to be implemented. Courts do not typically draw
this sort of line and recovery for emotional harm is not likely to engage legislative interest. Nonetheless, just as Professor Bell prefers a
deductible approach to no recovery, I would prefer it to full
recovery.8 3
Those who support the full recovery rule might agree that most
claims for psychic harm would be trivial and still argue for that rule.
There are cases of significant harm, and if forced between compensating trivial harm or denying recovery for significant harm, the law
should choose the former to avoid the latter. This clearly is Professor
Bell's position.
My position differs for a number of reasons. First, the law should
be very cautious in expanding tort liability for intangible harm. As I
stated earlier, 84 there is an emerging concern with the present level of
compensation for such harm - a concern that I share. A stronger
argument can be made that any increase in compensation for personal injuries should be for economic loss, rather than for intangible
harm. On that score, Professor Miller's suggestion that compensation
for emotional harm be provided, but limited to any consequential ec5
onomic loss, makes more sense.
My attitude toward expanding liability for emotional harm would
be different if important social goals were ignored by failing to compensate such harm. I do not believe that to be the case. Tort law may
be an appropriate vehicle for vindicating societal interests in human
dignity, but those interests are much less threatened by negligent
than by intentional conduct. Even a dog, as Holmes once observed,
can tell the difference between being kicked and tripped over.88 As
Part I demonstrates, neither entitlement nor deterrence theories provide the necessary support for expanding liability for negligently in81. Id. at 385-86.
82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
83. In one respect a deductible approach represents overkill If this type of approach is
otherwise acceptable, I would suggest a threshold, rather than a deductible, by which the plaintiff could recover in full if the threshold is met. If the harm is significant, there is no particular
reason for lopping off the bottom end of the recovery.
84. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. In addition to the Time Essay, supra
note 40, see Kester, Are Lawyers Becoming Public Enemy Number One?, THE WAsHiNGTONiAN,

Feb. 1984, at 114. While this was written by a lawyer, and much of it is superficial, it does
capture what I perceive to be the popular sentiment.
85. See Miller, supra note 3, at 38-43.
86. 0. HOLmEs, Ti COMMON LAw 3 (1881).
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flicted emotional harm.
The second reason for opposing the full recovery rule relates primarily to the kind of case with which my first article was principally
concerned - emotional harm to bystanders caused by witnessing injury to another person. My point there, to which I still adhere, is that
damages will not compensate persons suffering such harm the same
way damages compensate physical pain and suffering. 7
My final argument relates to this point and to my earlier discussion on the desirability of tougher emotional hides.8 8 The Supreme
Court of Hawaii in Rodriques v. State89 ruled that emotional harm
must be serious to be compensible. The court defined "serious mental
distress" as distress which would make "a reasonable man, normally
constituted, . . . unable to adequately cope with the mental distress
engendered by the circumstances." 90 With such a test of seriousness
only a tiny fraction of all the assaults on psychic well-being would be
serious; and that fraction would not likely increase much if the universe measured were composed of only culpable assaults. This is not
because the number of significant emotionally traumatic events
would be so small; it is because most people are "normally constituted" and can "adequately cope" with traumatic events. A subsequent Hawaiian case, Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station,91 illustrates my point. The plaintiffs were members of a family, a
husband, wife, and their four children, who sued for emotional harm
they suffered when their dog died as a result of the defendant's negligent handling of the dog. The loss of a family pet can be distressing.
However, to suggest that "normally constituted" persons - adults
and children - cannot adequately cope with the loss of a pet, as the
court did by affirming a total judgment of $1,000 for five of the plaintiffs, is to express a rather low opinion of their psychological resilience. Many people have lost pets or close family members, or have
witnessed them injured or killed, and yet survived with their psyches
intact. And they do so without compensation. That is the normal response and as I argued in my earlier article, damages will not enable
the victims to cope more adequately, nor in any meaningful sense
compensate for their loss.
III. CONCLUSION

When I wrote my earlier article on liability to bystanders for neg87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Pearson, supra note 2, at. 501-04.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1980).
Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
63 Hawaii 587, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981).
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ligently inflicted emotional harm, I thought I had set out to accomplish a fairly easy task: to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the Dillon
and similar cases. Those cases continue to make no analytical sense.
It is not rational to permit recovery by Mrs. Dillon, and then deny
recovery to a father in the delivery room who witnesses his newborn
child die. 2 Professor Bell agrees.93 I perceived little judicial willingness to take the next step and create a general tort of negligent infliction of emotional harm. Instead, I hoped most courts would stay with
the zone of danger rule. 4 Other courts, I expected, would sometimes
impose liability and sometimes deny it, based on nothing other than
some rough sense of justice. 5 I addressed the broader rule - what
Professor Bell calls the full recovery rule - not so much to deal
with what I viewed as a substantial possibility, but rather to round
out the paper. Professor Bell's article has changed the nature of the
debate. Although I am not persuaded, his thesis is thoughtful and
thoroughly researched. It is scholarship of the first order. For those
of us who feel expansion of tort liability is not always in the public
interest, the article is a force to be reckoned with.
ADDENDUM

Just as Professor Bell's article, and my response to it, went into
print, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Champion v. Gray 6 and
Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Division.97 In these cases, the court rejected both the impact and the zone of danger rules.9 8 Just what rule
will emerge from these opinions, however, is not entirely clear, and I
would like to comment briefly on these cases.
In Champion, the court expanded the class of persons who can
recover to include those outside the zone of danger of physical impact
who are close family members"9 of the primary victim and who are
"directly involved in the event causing the original injury." 10 0 The
92. Justus v. Anderson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
93. Bell, supra note 1, at 401.
94. At least one court recently abandoned the impact rule for the zone of danger rule. See
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Il. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
95. See Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983); Barnes
v. Geiger, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 466 N.E.2d 78 (1983); Nutter v. Frisbie Mem. Hosp., 124 N.H.
791, 474 A.2d 584 (1984).
96. 1985 Fla. L.W. 164 (Fla. March 8, 1985).
97. 1985 Fla. L.W. 156 (Fla. March 8, 1985).
98. In Champion v. Gray, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the unfairness of the impact rule, but steered away from the Dillon zone of danger rule due to the threat of possible
future abuses. Id. at 165-66. On the same day, the court also handed down Brown v. Cadillac
Motor Car Div., which incorporated by reference the reasoning of Champion v. Gray. Id. at 156.
99. Id. at 165.
100. Id. at 165-66.
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court added that if "such a person sees [the accident], hears it or
arrives upon the scene while the injured party is still there, the person is likely involved."'0' In terms of the circumstances surrounding
the plaintiff's injury, then, Champion fits fairly comfortably within
Dillon v. Leggl 2 and the cases that have more or less followed it.'03
Beyond that, it is less than clear what rule Champion intended to
adopt. Read literally, the court appears to have limited the kind of
harm for which damages are available to the physical injuries caused
by the trauma of involvement in the accident, and to have excluded
compensation for either the psychic trauma itself or the non-physical
consequences of the psychic trauma. While the question certified to
the court asked only whether there could be compensation for physical injury caused by psychic trauma," 4 Champion broadly discussed
the impact, zone of danger and bystander recovery rules. The court
made it clear, however, that its concern in expanding liability was
with physical injury. The court noted Florida's public policy is to
"compensate for physical injuries, the attendant lost wages, and
physical and mental suffering which flow from the consequences of
the physical injuries."'' °0 The Champion court ruled a cause of action
exists "for damages flowing from a significant discernible physical injury when such injury is caused by psychic trauma resulting from
negligent injury imposed on another who, because of his relationship
to the injured party and his involvement in the event causing that
injury, is foreseeably injured."' °6
101. Id. at 166.
102. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
103. The court referred to the English case of McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 2 A.E.R. 298
(1982), which permitted recovery by a plaintiff who first saw the primary victim at the hospital
after the accident. The Massachusetts high court would also permit recovery under such circumstances. See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 307, 413 N.E.2d 690

(1980). The Supreme Court of Florida refused to say whether it would extend liability that far
but it did observe that such a case would "reach the outer limits of the required involvement."
1985 Fla. L.W. at 166.
104. The Fifth Circuit of Appeal certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme
Court as a matter of great public importance: "Should Florida abrogate the 'impact rule' and
allow recovery for the physical consequences resulting from mental or emotional stress caused
by the defendant's negligence in the absence of physical impact upon the plaintiff?" Id. at 165.
Champion was a wrongful death case, and under the Florida wrongful death statute, a decedent's action for personal injuries does not survive his death. FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (1983). Thus,
there could be no recovery for the psychic trauma causing the death in any event. This may
explain why the certified question related only to the physical consequences of the psychic
trauma.
105. 1985 Fla. L.W. at 165.
106. Id. at 166. In footnote 3 of the opinion, the court cites a number of cases from other
jurisdictions which have abrogated the impact rule. The court cites two cases that "limit...
that recovery to the physical consequences of emotional trauma .. " Id. at n.3. While the
court thus indicates such a rule exists, however, the cited cases do not support that position.
Once case, Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979), clearly permits recovery for
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From my perspective, a rule limiting damages to those resulting
from physical injury makes sense. In fact, with the focus on the physical injury, there would be no need for Dillon type limits on who
could recover. Instances in which persons would suffer "significant
discernible physical injury" would be rare in any event and, when it
does occur, it very likely would be limited to close family members at
the scene of the accident. Expanding liability for physical injury to
the limit of foreseeability would not involve a substantial risk of
fraudulent claims, a risk that concerned the court.10 7 Such a rule
would treat psychically caused physical injury like any other physical
injury. The test of liability would be foreseeability. More importantly, liability based on the foreseeability of physical harm would
not be open to the charge of arbitrariness, one of my criticisms of the
Dillon case.
In my original article, I objected to the physical injury requirement as a screen for cases in which compensation for phychic harm is
deserving.1 0 s My attitude toward what may be the Champion requirement is different. If compensation for the physical injury is all that is
available, there would be considerably less temptation for courts to
play games with that concept. The stakes would be a lot lower. Substantial damages may be at stake if physical injury, even if minor,
opens the door to recovery for general psychic harm. A court sympathetic to the plaintiff's claim for psychic harm may well be tempted
to characterize a few sleepness nights and a few days of nausea as
physical injury. If compensation is just for the physical injury, however, there is less incentive to characterize the plaintiff's condition as
physical injury. Doing so would only provide minimal compensation
for minor injury.
It is unclear, however, whether the court would limit damages to
those for physical injury, thereby excluding damages for the preceding psychic trauma and whatever purely psychic and non-physical
manifestations might exist. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alderman seemed to think the court had not limited recovery to that for
physical injury. Justice Alderman stated while Champion modified
Florida's impact rule, he did not believe the case established any
rigid rules which would set the parameters for future psychic trauma
cases. Justice Alderman believed that the outer limits of recovery
purely psychic harm. The other case cited by the court, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978), is ambiguous on the point. The later case of Ferriter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., however, does make clear that Massachusetts will permit recovery for
the purely psychic elements of the harm. 381 Mass. 307, 316, 413 N.E.2d, 690, 696 (1980).
107. 1985 Fla. L.W. at 165.
108. See Pearson, supra note 2, at 509-10.
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would have to be established on a case-by-case basis. 10 9
The court's opinion in Brown was also ambiguous. In Brown, the
bystander plaintiff proved emotional distress, but no consequent
physical injury. In denying liability, the court held that "psychological trauma must cause a demonstrable physical injury such as death,
paralysis, muscular impairment, or similar objectively discernible
physical impairment before a cause of action may exist." The court
further stated that "there is no cause of action for psychological
trauma alone when resulting from simple negligence."" 0 It is unclear,
however, whether the phrase "a cause of action" refers to a claim for
purely psychic harm or to one for only physical injury.
If the court intended to adopt a rule in Champion and Brown
providing compensation for psychic trauma as well as physical injury,
the same objection I earlier expressed to physical injury as a screen
in emotional harm cases"' would apply to the new Florida law. The
instability of the impact rule stemmed from the incongruence of the
damages rule and the liability rule. Under the impact rule, a plaintiff
could recover for emotional harm, but only if there was an impact.
Obviously, the existence of emotional harm does not depend upon
whether there is an impact. Thus, courts have acted predictably by
first permitting recovery in the face of trivial impacts and now abandoning the impact rule entirely." 2 The same process has occurred
with respect to the physical injury requirement. First, courts have
trivialized the requirement of physical injury"' and now many courts
have altogether abandoned the requirement as inconsistent with the
purpose of compensating for emotional harm." 4
The Supreme Court of Florida appears to have recognized this
problem, and seems to have attempted to put some teeth in the physical harm requirement. In Champion, the court speaks of "death or
significant discernible physical injury""15 as the requirement. In
109.

1985 Fla. L.W. at 166 (Alderman, J., concurring).

We today modify to a limited extent our previous holdings on the impact doctrine. In
doing so, however, we are unable to establish a rigid hard and fast rule that would set
the parameters for recovery for psychic trauma in every case that may arise. The outer
limits of this cause of action will be established by the courts of this state in the traditional manner of the common law on a case-by-case basis.

Id.
110. Id. at 156.
111. See Pearson, supra note 2.
112. See Pearson, supra note 2, at 485-90.
113. See supra text accompanying note 108.
114. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 606 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980); Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583 (Mont. 1983).
115. 1985 Fla. L.W. at 165.
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Brown, the court stated the requirement as "a demonstrable physical
impairment such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or similar
objectively discernible physical impairment ....,,n1 The existence of
purely psychic harm, however, does not depend upon the existence of
physical injury. If it is desirable to compensate for purely psychic
harm, it seems inevitable that close cases on the physical injury issue
will be decided for plaintiffs. If so, the physical injury requirement
will in time erode into insignificance. In any event, one thing is clear.
The Supreme Court of Florida has spoken only the first, and not the
last, words on its abrogation of the impact rule.

116.

Id. at 156.
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